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Abstract
Theoretical models of government formation in political science
usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper,
we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in
which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We
characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equi-
librium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the
agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coali-
tion are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition
with any of the small players.
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11 Introduction
Can a head of state choose the composition of a cabinet by selecting the order
in which party leaders attempt to form the government? Can the chairman of
a board decide on the composition of an executive committee by choosing the
order in which board members speak? It is generally believed that the answer
to these questions is at least partially positive: under some circumstances,
the head of state or the chairman of the board can use their agenda setting
power toin‡uence the coalitionsformed asthe outcome of bargaining between
parties or board members. In the political realm, the head of state’s ability
to in‡uence the formation of government coalitions varies from country to
country. While very few constitutions have speci…c provisions on the order in
which party leaders are recognized to form governments, in some countries,
the power of the head of state is limited by conventions, which dictate that
the largest party should be asked to form the government …rst. In other
countries, like Finland or Italy, the President of the Republic has used his
power to choose the order in which parties attempt to form the government
(Strom, Budge and Laver, 1994).
In this paper, we develop a formal model of agenda control to analyze
the power of the head of state or the chairman of the board in in‡uencing
the coalitions formed. In particular, we relate the power of the agenda setter
to the underlying decisive structure among players. Is it easier for a head of
state to manipulate the outcome of coalitional bargaining when all parties
have equal size, or when parties are asymmetric? Are small or large parties
more likely to be imposed in the cabinet? How should the head of state
design the order of moves in relation to the parties’ weights? We provide an
answer to these questions in the general context of cooperative simple games,
where coalitions of players are divided between losing and winning coalitions.
More speci…cally, we suppose that the agenda setter selects an ordering
2of the players, and that bargaining occurs according to the following simple
sequential procedure. When a player is recognized to make a proposal, she
o¤ers to form a coalition with other players. If all coalition members agree,
the coalition is formed and the game ends. If at least one of the players
rejects the o¤er, the next player in the sequence is recognized to make an
o¤er. If at the end of the sequence, no coalition has been formed, all players
obtain their …xed status quo outcome.
Our main result shows that the only structure in which the agenda setter
can fully manipulate the outcome of coalitional bargaining is the apex struc-
ture, with one large player and n ¡ 1 small players, where the large player
only needs one of the small players to form a winning coalition. In all other
structures, the power of the agenda setter is limited: he may be able to force
the presence of some of the players in the coalition formed, but cannot ma-
nipulate the order to guarantee that any possible minimal winning coalition
is formed. If all players are symmetric, the agenda setter’s power is even
more limited: he can only choose one player to be included in the coalition,
and one player to be excluded from the coalition.
Furthermore, for any simple game, we completely characterize the sets of
players who can be included in the coalition formed by the agenda setter. We
also show that when players can be ordered by desirability, as in parliaments,
where parties are more desirable if they have more seats, the agenda setter
should choose the least desirable coalition member to be the …rst mover, and
the most desirable member outside the coalition to be the second mover. In
the context of cabinet formation, this implies that the head of state should
recognize …rst the smallest party he wants to include in the coalition, and let
the largest party he wants to exclude be the second mover.
In the political science literature, the agenda setting role of the head of
state is usually left unmodeled. For example, in their recent wide-ranging
analysis of cabinet formation based on policy portfolios, Laver and Shepsle
3(1994, pp. 53-54) indicate that “It is at well to be quite clear that [they]
assume that the recognition of the actors who can propose new governments
is non-strategic. This implies for example that the head of state is not a
strategic actor in the government formation process”. Similarly, Baron (1991,
p. 137) notes that, in his noncooperative model of government formation,
“the political bargaining begins with a non-strategic president or monarch
who selects a party to be accorded the opportunity to attempt to form a
government”. Hence, our paper contributes to the noncooperative theory of
coalition formation in political science by endogenizing the agenda setting
role of the head of state.
Once the head of state has chosen the ordering of proposers, the model
of coalitional bargaining we adopt is directly inspired by the noncoopera-
tive models of coalition formation initiated by Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
and Austen-Smith and Banks (1988). As in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), we
assume a purely redistributive framework, and do not incorporate an ide-
ological dimension in party preferences. (See also Baron (1991 and 1993)
and Jackson and Moselle (1998) for models of coalition formation where par-
ties have preferences over policy outcomes.) In all these models, the order
in which players are recognized is exogenously …xed. For example, Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) assume that the probability of being recognized is pro-
portional to the number of seats whereas Austen-Smith and Banks (1988)
suppose that parties are given the opportunity to form a government in the
order given by their number of seats. In recent empirical work, Merlo (1997)
and Diermeier and Merlo (1999) investigate the empirical validity of di¤erent
bargaining procedures. In particular, Diermeier and Merlo (1999) note that
the data do not support the procedure described by Austen-Smith and Banks
(1988), but give some validity to the proportional procedure of Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). They also note the incumbent is more likely to be selected
to attempt to form the new government.
4In the game-theoretic literature on coalitional bargaining, Chatterjee et
al. (1993), Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) have analyzed sequential
models where the order of proposers and responders is …xed by an exoge-
nous protocol. These studies emphasize the role played by the protocol in
the determination of the equilibrium coalitions and the division of coalitional
payo¤s. We believe that our work also sheds light on these models of non-
cooperative coalitional bargaining by analyzing (in the restricted context of
simple games) the relation between the protocol and the coalitions formed
in equilibrium.
Finally, our model bears a more distant relationship to the study of
agenda control in binary voting surveyed in Rosenthal (1990) and Miller
(1995). The description of the role of the agenda setter in those models is
quite di¤erent from ours. In binary voting, the agenda setter has the abil-
ity to choose the proposal to be pitted against the status quo (as in the
seminal work of Romer and Rosenthal (1978)) or the complete sequence
of binary votes (as in the tournament context of Miller (1980) and Banks
(1985)). Once a pair of alternatives has been chosen, agents vote between
the two alternatives. As in our work, the main objective of the literature is
to characterize the set of outcomes which can be obtained for any agenda,
and study the strategic role of the agenda setter. However, di¤erences in the
models preclude a direct comparison between the …ndings of the literature
on binary voting and our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
fully the power of the head of state in the formation of a cabinet with …ve
parties or less. In Section 3, we introduce our general framework and derive,
for any …xed ordering of proposers, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
noncooperative model of coalition formation. In Section 4, we analyze the
power of the agenda setter and prove our main theorem, characterizing the
decisive structures under which the agenda setter can fully manipulate the
5outcome of the procedure of coalition formation. The last Section contains
our conclusions, and a discussion of the limitations of our analysis.
2 Cabinet Formation with 3, 4 and 5 Parties
To illustrate the problem of the agenda setter in coalition formation, we
analyze in this section the role of the head of state in the formation of a
cabinet with three, four and …ve parties. At the beginning of the game,
the head of state chooses the sequence in which the di¤erent party leaders
attempt to form a government.1 We suppose that each party leader has an
opportunity to form the government, and that no party can be called twice in
the sequence.2 When a party leader is recognized to form a government, she
makes an o¤er to the other parties to join in a government. If all prospective
members accept the o¤er, the government is formed and the game ends. If at
least one of the coalition members rejects the o¤er, the game continues, and
the next party in the sequence is recognized to form the government. If all
o¤ers have been rejected at the end of the sequence, all parties obtain their
status quo outcome.
We suppose, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), that parties’ preferences
only depend on their share in the government bene…ts, and not on the policy
1We assume that the head of state commits to the entire sequence of moves at the
beginning of the game. Alternatively, one could consider that the head of state only
chooses the identity of the next proposer after an attempt to form the governement has
failed. To model this situation, the head of state has to be treated as a player in the
sequential game, who can condition his choice on the past history. This would lead to
a di¤erent model, which is more complex to analyze, and does not allow for a simple
description of the relation between the order of moves and the outcome of bargaining.
2As long as the sequence of moves if …nite, the assumption that no party moves twice
in the game is made without loss of generality. (See the discussion in the last Section of
the paper.)
6chosen by the government. 3 Hence, a proposal to form the government only
entails a division of the government bene…ts among the parties. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that the government bene…ts are equal to one for
all the possible coalitional governments, and that the status quo outcome is
identically equal to zero for all the parties.
The only source of heterogeneity among parties in our model thus stems
from the distribution of seats in parliament. Letting wi denote the number
of seats of party i in parliament, a coalitional government C can be formed





2 : Disregarding the uninteresting case where one
party obtains a majority of seats in parliament, or when some parties are
“dummy players”, who do not play a signi…cant role in parliament, we can
easily characterize the decisive structures with three, four and …ve players.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, pp. 457-462) were the …rst to note
that, while there are of course a large number of possible distributions of
seats in parliament, there are only a few prototypical decisive structures
which represent the distribution of power among the parties. To characterize
these decisive structures, we recall the de…nition of a weighted quota game.
A weighted quota game is de…ned by a list [q;w1;w2;::;wn] where q denotes
the quota, wi the weight of player i and a coalition C is winning if and only if
P
i2C wi ¸ q. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, pp. 457-462) show that
there are only six weighted quota games representing the decisive structures
for less than …ve players.
For n = 3, the structure [2;1;1;1]
For n = 4, the structure [3;2;1;1;1]
For n = 5, the structures [3;1;1;1;1;1];[4;2;2;1;1;1];[4;3;1;1;1;1];
[5;3;2;2;1;1]:
3We discuss in the conclusion the extension of our model to a situation where parties’
preferences depend on policy outcomes.
7With three players, the only decisive structure is the simple majority
case, where two players out of three are needed to form the government.
The structures [3;2;1;1;1] and [4;3;1;1;1;1] are examples of apex games
where there exists a single large player, who can form a winning coalition
with any of the small players. The structure [3;1;1;1;1;1] is a symmetric
majority game, where all players are identical and a majority is formed by
more than a half of the players. The other two structures, [4;2;2;1;1;1]
and [5;3;2;2;1;1] distinguish between large, middle and small players, and
represent more complex distributions of power among the parties.
As a …rst step in the analysis, we need to determine, for every possible
ordering of the parties, the coalitionsformed in equilibrium. We will illustrate
the basic principles with the case of three parties. Clearly, the last party in
the sequence can extract the entire surplus by paying the other parties their
status quo outcome of 0. The second party in the sequence thus should never
propose to form a coalition with the last party, but should instead propose
to form a coalition with the …rst party, paying the …rst party its continuation
payo¤ of 0, and keeping a surplus of 1. Hence, at the beginning of the game,
the …rst party never proposes to form a coalition with the second party, but
forms instead a coalition with the last party.4
The same reasoning can be applied to compute the coalitions formed in
equilibrium with four parties. Reorder the parties, so that party 1 is the large
party and 2, 3 and 4 are the small parties. Barring symmetries between the
small parties, there are four distinct orderings to consider. Consider …rst the
ordering 1;2;3;4. At the last stage of the game, party 4 obtains the entire
surplus. Hence party 3 should form a coalition excluding the fourth party,
4This result has also been obtained by Austen Smith and Banks (1988) when parties’
preferences are de…ned over government bene…ts and policy outcomes. In their model, the
coalition is formed by the largest party (the …rst player in the game) and the smallest
party (the last player in the game).
8namely coalition f1;3g or coalition f1;2;3g. Party 2 then should choose to
form a coalition with party 1 or parties 1 and 4. At the beginning of the
game, party 1 thus either forms the coalition f1;3g or f1;4g or f1;3;4g.
Next consider the ordering 2;1;3;4. Party 4 again obtains the entire surplus,
so that party 3 should form either the coalition f1;3g or f1;2;3g. Party
1 thus selects to form coalition f1;2g, coalition f1;4g or coalition f1;2;4g.
Party 2 then forms a coalition excluding party 1, namely the coalition of
small parties f2;3;4g. If now the ordering is 2;3;1;4, at the last stage of
the game, party 4 still captures the entire surplus. Hence party 1 forms any
of the three coalitions f1;2g, f1;3g or f1;2;3g. Party 3 then chooses to
form the coalition f2;3;4g, and party 2 forms a coalition excluding party
3, namely any of the coalitions f1;2g or f1;2;4g. Finally, if the ordering is
2;3;4;1, party 1 captures the entire surplus at the last stage of the game.
Hence party 4 forms f2;3;4g. Party 3 then forms either f1;3g or f1;2;3g
and party 2 forms either f1;2g or f1;2;4g.
The analysis of the coalitions formed at equilibrium for n = 3 and n = 4
shows that at each stage of the game, the party which is recognized can
capture the entire surplus, by forming a winning coalition which excludes
the next party in the sequence. Hence, in equilibrium, the …rst party forms
any winning coalition excluding the second party. This result shows that the
only relevant part of the sequence of moves chosen by the head of state are
the identities of the …rst and second parties. Hence, when computing the
equilibrium coalition, we can restrict our attention to the identities of the
…rst two parties in the sequence.
We now consider the coalitions formed with 5 parties in the di¤erent
decisive structures. In the symmetric structure [3;1;1;1;1;1], all orderings
are equivalent. If parties 1 and 2 are the …rst two parties, the equilibrium
minimal winning coalitions are f1;3;4g, f1;3;5g and f1;4;5g and f1;3;4;5g.
Consider now the structure with two large parties and three small parties,
9[4;2;2;1;1;1]. Let 1 and 2 denote the large parties and 3, 4 and 5 the small
parties. Ignoring symmetries, there are four orderings of the …rst two parties
to consider: either the large parties are placed on top, or one large and one
small party, or one small and one large party, or two small parties. The






In the apex game, with party 1 denoting the large party, there are three
orderings of the …rst two parties to consider: either party 1 is …rst, or a small





Finally, in the structure [5;3;2;2;1;1], we let 1 denote the large party,
2 and 3 the middle parties and 4 and 5 the small parties. There are now 8










These tables can now be used to analyze the power of the agenda setter
in the di¤erent decisive structures. It is obvious that the head of state can
always choose one party to be included in the coalition (the …rst in the order)
and one party to be excluded in the coalition (the second in the order). Can
the head of state impose the presence of other parties in the government?
The answer to this question depends crucially on the decisive structure of
the game. For example, consider the symmetric structure with …ve parties,
[3;1;1;1;1;1]. In that symmetric majority game, the head of state can never
guarantee the presence of more than one party in the government. If party
1 is recognized …rst, she may form a coalition with either parties 3 and 4,
4 and 5 or 3 and 5. There is no way to force the presence of either of
those three parties in the government. By contrast, consider the structure
with one large party and four small parties, [4;3;1;1;1;1]. This game has
…ve minimal winning coalitions: f1;2g;f1;3g;f1;4g;f1;5g and f2;3;4;5g.
We claim that the head of state can guarantee the presence of any minimal
winning coalition in the government. In order to guarantee a coalition with
two parties, f1;2g, the head of state can choose any order placing 2 …rst and
1 in third, fourth or …fth position. In order to guarantee the formation of
11the coalition of small parties, the head of state should place the large party
second. In the structure with two large parties and three small parties, the
head of state can guarantee the presence of one small party and one large
party in the coalition, say parties 2 and 3, by placing party 3 …rst and party
1 second, but cannot guarantee the presence of any other group of parties in
the equilibrium coalition. In the structure with one large party, two middle
parties and two small parties, [5;3;2;2;1;1], the head of state can guarantee
the presence of one large and one middle party, say parties 1 and 2, by
placing party 2 …rst and party 3 second. He can also impose the presence of
the minimal winning coalition consisting of the two middle parties 2 and 3
and one of the small parties, player 4, by placing party 4 …rst and party 1
second. However, the head of state cannot force the presence of the minimal
winning coalition f1;4;5g in the government: there exists no ordering of
the parties which guarantees that f1;4;5g always belongs to the equilibrium
coalition.
The study of government formation with …ve parties or less thus shows
that the agenda setter’s ability to impose the presence of a player in the equi-
librium coalition is related to the underlying decisive structure of the game.
In the next sections of the paper, we consider a general model of coalition
formation in simple games, and investigate fully the relation between the
power of the agenda setter and the underlying simple games.
3 Coalition Formation in Simple Games
We consider a TU cooperative game (N;v) where N is the set of players
and v a coalitional function, assigning to each nonempty subset C of N, a
real number v(C) 2 <+. Since our aim is to study the power of the agenda
setter in the determination of the coalition formed, rather than the division
12of payo¤s among coalition members, we focus in this paper on simple games.
Recall that a cooperative game is simple if and only if v(C) 2 f0;1g. A
coalition C is called winning if v(C) = 1 and losing if v(C) = 0.
We …rst recall some well known properties of simple games (see Weber
(1994), p.1291). A simple game is monotone if v(C) = 1;C ½ D ) v(D) =
1. For any monotone simple game, we can de…ne minimal winning coalitions
as the smallest winning coalitions of the game. A simple game is proper if
v(C) = 1 ) v(C) = 0, where C denotes the complement of the set C. A
simple game is strong if v(C) = 0 ) v(C) = 1. A simple game is decisive if
it is proper and strong. Player i is called a veto player if she belongs to all
winning coalitions. Player i is more desirable than player j if and only if, for
any coalition C excluding i and j, v(C [fjg) = 1 ) v(C [fig) = 1: Finally,
a player i is a dummy player if she does not belong to any minimal winning
coalition.
The procedure of coalition formation that we consider is a simple ex-
tensive form noncooperative game inspired by recent models of coalitional
bargaining (Chatterjee et al. (1993), Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999)).
Players are ordered according to a …xed protocol ½. Player i is called the ½-kth
player if ½(i) = k: The ½-…rst player starts the game by proposing a coalition
C to which she belongs and a division of the coalitional payo¤s among the
members of C, namely a vector of payo¤s fyigi2C such that yi ¸ 0 for all i
and
P
i2C yi = 1: All the members of C respond to the o¤er in the ordering
speci…ed by ½. If all members accept the o¤er, the coalition is formed, and
players obtain payo¤s xi = yi if i 2 C, xi = 0 if i = 2 C. If at least one of
the members rejects the o¤er, the ½-second player makes a proposal. If the
proposal of the second player is rejected, the third player makes a proposal.
The game continues in that way until the ½-last player makes a proposal. If
her proposal is in turn rejected, all players obtain their status quo payo¤,
13xi = ai with ai ¸ 0 and
P
ai < 1:5 Since the noncooperative game depends
on the underlying simple game v and the protocol ½, we denote it by G(v;½):
While this game of coalition formation embodies strong assumptions on
the bargaining procedure, we have adopted it because it is the simplest and
most transparent game where the protocol matters. Asthe game is …nite, and
the ordering of moves is deterministic, the payo¤s of players are completely
determined by the protocol. It is this feature of the game that we emphasize
here, because we focus on the relationship between the protocol and the
coalitions formed in equilibrium.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of the game of coalition formation is a
sequence of proposals and responses such that, at any point in the game,
all players act optimally. An equilibrium coalition is a coalition formed at a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. We are now ready to characterize
the equilibrium coalitions for any protocol ½ and any simple game v without
veto players.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the game v is monotone and does not have any
veto player. Then any coalition containing the ½-…rst player and excluding
the ½-second player is an equilibrium coalition of G(v;½). Furthermore, the
½-…rst player captures the entire coalitional surplus.
Proof. Let k = 1;2:::;n denote the ½-kth player. For any subgame
perfect equilibrium, we denote by Ck the coalition proposed by the kth player
in equilibrium. We will show by induction that, for any subgame perfect
5In the political interpretation, the status quo payo¤ represents the payo¤ of the parties
in a care-taking government, or when new elections are called. The speci…cation of a
vector of status quo payment also allows us to extend the analysis to an in…nite horizon
game where the …nite sequence of o¤ers is repeated. The status quo payo¤s can then be
interpreted as the continuation payo¤s of the players in a stationary perfect equilibrium
of the game, and the analysis of the game remains unchanged.
14equilibrium of the game, for any k = 1;2;::n¡1, the coalition formed by the
kth player excludes player k + 1, i.e. (k + 1) = 2 Ck:
We …rst de…ne the continuation payo¤ that player i obtains after the
o¤er of player k is rejected, uk
i: If the o¤er of player n is rejected, all players
obtain their status quo payo¤, so un
i = ai. Consider now the second to last
player, player n ¡ 1 and let S and T be two winning coalitions containing
player n ¡ 1 with n = 2 S and n 2 T. (It is always possible to …nd a winning
coalition containing n ¡ 1 and excluding n since Nnfng is winning and the
game is monotone.) The minimal amount that player n ¡ 1 must give to
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Next observe that since T is a winning coalition containing player n,















































showing that, in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, player n ¡ 1
forms a coalition which excludes player n.
Consider now the general step, and suppose that for all t > k, in all
subgame perfect equilibria of the game, t + 1 = 2 Ct: Consider again two
winning coalitions containing player k, S and T with k+1 = 2 S and k+1 2 T:
The minimal amount that player k must give to his coalition partners in







that, for any t ¸ k, the continuation payo¤s of the players are given by the
recursive expressions: ut
i = 0 if i = 2 Ct+1, ut
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i if i 2 Ct+1and i 6= t + 1
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establishing the induction result. To complete the proof, note that player
1 always forms a coalition excluding player 2 and that for all k ¸ 3, u1
k = 0.
So player 1 is indi¤erent among all the winning coalitions which exclude
player 2 and is able to capture the entire surplus.
Proposition 1 completely characterizes the subgame perfect equilibria of
the procedure of coalition formation, when the simple game does not have
any veto player. All subgame prefect equilibria induce the same distribution
of payo¤s, with the …rst player capturing the entire surplus.6 The logic
underlying the result is that in equilibrium, at any stage of the game, a
player o¤ers a coalition which excludes her immediate successor. Running
the argument backwards, it appears that at the beginning of the game, player
1 should always exclude player 2. Furthermore, since each player k ¸ 3 has
been excluded from the coalition formed by its immediate predecessor, her
continuation payo¤ in the game is zero, and hence the …rst player captures
the entire coalitional surplus.
6Notice that, in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, all the players except
the …rst one play weakly dominated strategies. They accept an o¤er of 0 immediately,
precluding the possibility of obtaining a positive payo¤ at later stages in the game. While
these strategies may seem unnatural, they are the only strategies consistent with subgame
perfect equilibrium play.
18The sequential structure of the game thus yields a very unequal distri-
bution of the surplus among the players. In order to mitigate this problem,
we could have assumed that every player has an outside option "i and must
obtain at least her outside option to participate in the government. For a
vector of "i’s small enough, the thrust of the analyis remains unchanged,
and in equilibrium, all players must exclude their immediate successor in
the coalition they form. With a vector of outside options, the equilibrium
coalition formed by the …rst player becomes determinate: it is the winning
coalition excluding player 2 and containing the players with the smallest out-
side option. Notice in particular, that in this slightly perturbed variant of
the game, the equilibrium coalition is always a minimal winning coalition.
The main di¢culty in the proof of Proposition 1 stems from the existence
of an arbitrary status quo payo¤ for the players. However, it is striking to
note that the equilibrium distribution of the surplus is independent of the
status quo and only depends on the ordering of the players. This result is
obtained because each player has an opportunity to make an o¤er, and hence
each player is excluded from a coalition at least once in the game, so that
her continuation payo¤ is equal to zero and independent of the status quo.
If the protocol did not let all players make an o¤er, this result would not
hold. Some players may never be excluded from the coalition formed, and
thus obtain at least their status quo payo¤.
The equilibrium characterization of Proposition 1 depends crucially on
the assumption that the game v does not have any veto player, so that any
player can form a winning coalition excluding her immediate successor. If
the simple game v admits veto players, the subgame perfect equilibria of
the game are not easily characterized and depend on the status quo payo¤s.
It appears that since veto players belong to winning coalitions, they must
earn at least their status quo payo¤ in equilibrium. The last veto player
in the game can secure for herself a large share of the surplus (one minus
19the minimum sum of status quo payo¤s of the other players in a winning
coalition), and other veto players can similarly obtain a share of the surplus
larger than their status quo payo¤. Depending on the order of veto and
nonveto players and the structure of the game, some nonveto players can also
obtain a positive share of the surplus. Overall, the equilibrium coalitions and
equilibrium payo¤s depend in a complex way on the ordering of players and
the status quo outcomes.
The only case where the equilibrium of a game with veto players can
easily be characterized is when all status quo payo¤s are equal to zero. In
that case, the last veto player captures the entire surplus. Let k denote that
last veto player. It is easy to see that in equilibrium, the continuation payo¤
obtained by the players after the o¤er of player k has been rejected are 0 for
all i 6= k + 1 and 1 for player k + 1. Since however, by assumption, player
k + 1 is not a veto player, player k can form a winning coalition excluding
player k+1, and propose 0 to all coalition members. Hence, when it is player
k’s turn to make an o¤er, she can secure for herself a payment of 1. Next,
since player k is a veto player, she must belong to any winning coalition, and
hence any player j making o¤ers before player k must o¤er her continuation
payo¤ of 1.
The fact that the last veto player obtains the entire surplus is hardly
surprising given the sequential structure of the procedure we analyze. When
there are veto players, our game can be construed as a simple extension of
an ultimatum game (when all players are veto players, our game is exactly
an ultimatum game), and the last player can thus obtain the entire surplus.
4 Agenda Control and Coalitions
In this section, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the
order ½ in which players make o¤ers in the noncooperative game of coalition
20formation. We focus here on games without veto players. By Proposition 1,
the only relevant part of the protocol ½ is the choice of the …rst two players.S
Proposition 1 also clearly shows that an agenda setter can always impose the
presence of one of the players (player 1) and exclude another player (player
2) from the equilibrium coalition. We are thus interested in situations where
the agenda setter wants to impose the presence of more than one player in
the equilibrium coalition.
De…nition 2 The agenda setter can impose the presence of a set S of players
in the game v if there exists an ordering ½ such that the set S belongs to all
equilibrium coalitions of the game G(v;½).
Using the characterization result of Proposition 1, we can prove the fol-
lowing Proposition.
Proposition 3 Let v be a monotone game without veto players. The agenda
setter can impose the presence of a set S of players in the game v if and only if
there exists a player i 2 S and a player j = 2 S such that for all k 2 S;k 6= i,
v(Nnfj;kg) = 0. To impose the presence of the set S, the agenda setter
chooses ½(i) = 1;½(j) = 2:
Proof. Suppose that the condition is satis…ed, and consider an ordering
where i is placed …rst and j is placed second. By Proposition 1, any winning
coalition containing i and excluding j is an equilibrium coalition. Now, if
there exists k 2 S; k 6= i such that k does not belong to an equilibrium coali-
tion, there must exist a winning coalition excluding j and k, contradicting
the assumption.
Suppose now that the condition is violated, and consider any ordering of
the players. Let i and j be the …rst and second players in that ordering. If
21j 2 S, by Proposition 1, j does not belong to the equilibrium coalition, and
hence the agenda setter cannot impose the presence of S: If now j = 2 S, since
the condition is violated, there exists k 2 S;k 6= i such that v(Nnfj;kg) = 1.
Hence, by Proposition 1, Nnfj;kg is an equilibrium coalition, and the agenda
setter cannot impose the presence of S.
Proposition 3 provides a simple criterion to check whether a coalition
can be imposed by the agenda setter. In the de…nition of the criterion, two
players play a particular role: a member of the coalition i who is placed …rst
by the agenda setter, and a player outside the coalition, player j, who is
placed second in the order. It is easy to see that, if players can be ordered
by the desirability relation, in order to meet the condition, player i should
be selected as the least desirable member of the coalition, and player j as the
most desirable player outside the coalition. Formally,
Proposition 4 Let v be a monotone game without veto players. If the
agenda setter can impose the presence of a set S of players by choosing
½(i) = 1 and ½(j) = 2, and if i0 2 S is less desirable than i and j0 = 2 S
is more desirable than j, then the agenda setter can impose the presence of
the set S by choosing ½(i0) = 1 and ½(j0) = 2:
Proof. Since the agenda setter can impose the presence of S by placing i
…rst and j second, 8k 2 S;k 6= i; v(Nnfj;kg) = 0. To prove the proposition,
we simply need to show that 8k 2 S; k 6= i0; v(Nnfj0;kg) = 0. For all k 2
S;k 6= i;v(fj0g[Nnfj;j0;kg) = 0. Since j0 is more desirable than j, v(fjg[
Nnfj;j0;kg) = v(Nnfj0;kg) = 0. In particular, v(Nnfj0;i0g) = v(fig [
Nnfi;i0;j0g) = 0. Since i is more desirable than i0, v(fi0g [ Nnfi;i0;j0g) =
v(Nnfi;j0g) = 0, completing the proof of the Proposition.
While the de…nition of the criterion of Proposition 3and of the desirability
relation may be di¢cult to interpret in general simple games, they are more
22transparent in weighted quota games. Recall that in a weighted quota game,
player i is more desirable than player j if and only if wi ¸ wj. We can now
combine Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 to characterize the sets of players
who can imposed by an agenda setter in weighted quota games.
Corollary 5 Let v be a weighted quota game. For any coalition C, let aC and
bC be the smallest and largest players in C. The agenda setter can impose the
presence of a set S of players if and only if 8i 2 S, i 6= aS;wi +wbS > 1¡q.
To illustrate Corollary 5, consider the present (as of December 1999)
composition of the Dutch parliament.
party seats
Social democrats (PvDA) 45
Liberals (VVD) 38
Christian Democrats (CDA) 29




Since the Parliament contains 150 seats and a simple majority is needed
to form the government, the quota is given by q = 76. From Corollary
5, it appears that the head of state can impose the presence of the Social
Democrats with any other party but the Liberals, and the presence of the
Liberals with any other party but the Social Democrats. These are the
only groups of parties that the head of state can impose in the equilibrium
coalition.
In the preceding analysis, we have characterized the set of players that
the agenda setter can impose in an equilibrium coalition. Irrespective of
23the underlying game, the agenda setter can always impose the presence of
one agent (the …rst) in the winning coalition. Proposition 3 shows that,
under some restrictions on the underlying simple game, the agenda setter can
impose the presence of larger sets of players in the equilibrium coalition. Can
the agenda setter impose the presence of all members of a winning coalition?
Clearly, if a nonminimal winning coalition is an equilibrium coalition of the
game, there exists a minimal winning coalition which is also obtained in
equilibrium. Hence, the agenda setter can never impose the presence of all
players in a winning coalition which is not minimal. We now characterize
the simple games for which the agenda setter can impose the presence of any
minimal winning coalition in the equilibrium coalition.
To this end, we restrict our attention to decisive games (games which are
both proper and strong) and we exclude dummy players. A decisive game v
is called an apex game if there exists a player i such that v(fi;jg) = 1 for all
j in N. We now state our main Theorem.
Theorem 6 Let v be a decisive simple game without veto players nor dummy
players. The agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning
coalition in the equilibrium coalition if and only if v is an apex game.
Proof. We …rst show that, if v is an apex game, the agenda setter can
impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition. Let i be the large
player. Consider …rst a two player coalition S = fi;jg. For any k = 2 S,
v(Nnfi;kg) = 0. Now consider the coalition of all the small players, S =
Nnfig. For any k 2 S, v(Nnfi;kg) = 0 . Hence the condition of Proposition
3 is satis…ed for any minimal winning coalition S.
To prove the reverse implication, consider a game v for which all minimal
winning coalitions can be imposed. We will show that the game v is an apex
game. If jNj = 3, the result is immediate. So suppose that jNj ¸ 4. Since
24the game is proper, there must exist a minimal winning coalition S with
jSj ¸ 3. As the head of state can impose the presence of all the players of S
in the equilibrium coalition, there exist two players a and b in S and a player
z = 2 S for whom v(fa;zg) = v(fb;zg) = 1:
Now de…ne Z = fi 2 N;i 6= z;v(fi;zg) = 1g: The set Z is the set of
all players who are winning with z, and by our previous argument, jZj ¸ 2.
Suppose that there exists a player i 2 N;i 6= z such that i = 2 Z. Since
i is not a dummy player, there exists a minimal winning coalition Si to
which she belongs. Now observe that, since the game is proper, for all a 2
Z;v(Nnfa;zg) = 0. This implies that the winning coalition Si must either
contain z or all the players in Z, i.e. either z 2 Si or Z ½ Si. We now show
that v(Z) = 0. Suppose to the contrary that v(Z) = 1. By minimality of the
winning coalition Si; we cannot have Z ½ Si. Hence z 2 Si. Furthermore,
as v(Z) = 1 and the game is proper, Si \Z 6= ;, implying that there exists
a 2 Z such that fa;zg ½ Si, contradicting the minimality of the winning
coalition Si.
Since v(Z) = 0 and the game is strong, v(NnZ) = 1. Hence there exists
a minimal winning coalition S ½ NnZ. Clearly, since Z Ã S, z 2 S: We now
claim that jSj = 2. Suppose by contradiction that jSj ¸ 3. Since the head
of state can impose the presence of all players in S in the minimal winning
coalition, there exists d 2 S;d 6= z and y = 2 S such that v(fd;y)g = 1: Now
recall that v(fa;zg) = v(fb;zg) = 1: Since the game is proper, d 6= z;d 6=
a;d 6= b and y 6= z, we must have y = a and y = b, contradicting the fact that
a and b are distinct elements of Z. We conclude that there exists a player
d = 2 Z for whom v(fd;zg) = 1, contradicting the de…nition of Z.
Hence, Z = Nnfzg, establishing that the game is an apex game.
Theorem 6 clari…es the relationship between the agenda setter’s control
and the underlying structure of power. In a sense, it shows that the agenda
25setter’s manipulation possibilities are rather restricted: he can only fully
choose the minimal winning coalition when the underlying simple game has
the speci…c structure of an apex game, with one large player and many small
players. In all other situations, the agenda setter’s power is very restricted.
He may be able to impose some but not all minimal winning coalitions, or
even not be able to impose the presence of any more than one player, as would
be the case in a symmetric majority game with more than …ve players, where
no two-player coalition is winning.
5 Conclusion
In the theoretical models of government formation in political science, it is
usually assumed that the head of state has no strategic power. In this pa-
per, we develop a formal model of agenda control to analyze the power of
an agenda setter in the formation of coalitions in simple games. We suppose
that the agenda setter can choose the order in which players make proposals
to form coalitions in a simple, sequential noncooperative procedure of coali-
tional bargaining. We show that the agenda setter can always impose the
presence of one agent in the coalition by placing him …rst, and exclude an-
other agent by placing him second. The only structure in which the agenda
setter can impose the formation of any minimal winning coalition are apex
games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the other
players. Furthermore, the agenda setter should always place the least desir-
able member of a coalition …rst, and the most desirable player outside the
coalition second.
While our results provide a …rst step in the understanding of the relation
between the order of proposers and the coalitions formed in a sequential bar-
gaining game, we point out some important limitations of our analysis, which
26need to be addressed in future research. First, we focus in this paper on a
purely redistributive model of coalition formation. In order to explain the
formation of governments in parliamentary democracies, we need to extend
the model to accommodate for ideological preferences of the political parties.
Austen Smith and Banks (1988) and Baron (1991 and 1993) have analyzed se-
quential models of government formation with three parties with preferences
over a policy space. In Austen Smith and Banks (1988), parties’ utilities also
depend on their share in the government bene…ts, and government bene…ts
are assumed to be large enough to compensate a coalition member for any
loss in utility due to an adverse policy choice. Hence, in equilibrium, the
…rst party chooses its optimal policy outcome, and uses a transfer in gov-
ernment bene…ts to induce the other coalition member to participate in the
government. In essence, the assumption that government bene…ts are high
enough implies that all transfers will be made through a redistribution of
government bene…ts, and the equilibrium is similar to the equilibrium in the
purely redistributive game. In Baron (1991 and 1993), parties have purely
ideological preferences, and bargain over policy outcomes. In that case, par-
ties’ strategies at the government formation stage are much more complex
to characterize, and the equilibria may involve di¤erent coalitions than the
ones obtained in the redistributive case. The characterization of equilibrium
coalitions with more than three parties in Baron’s models appears to be a
formidable task.
Second, we have focussed our attention to simple games, dividing the set
of coalitions into only two types, and only allowing for coalitional worths of 0
or 1. As shown in Chatterjee et al. (1993), the study of the relation between
the protocol and the equilibrium coalition in general cooperative games with
transferable utility is extremely complex. Chatterjee et al. (1993) show
that, in order for the grand coalition to be formed for any ordering of the
players, the per member worth of the grand coalition must exceed the per
27member worth of any other coalition. In all other cases, the coalition formed
in equilibrium may not be e¢cient (i.e. may be di¤erent from the grand
coalition for strictly superadditive games) and may depend on the protocol.
The exact link between the protocol and the coalition formed in equilibrium
is however di¢cult to characterize.
Third, we have considered a speci…c …nite procedure of sequential bar-
gaining, where each player is given the opportunity to form a coalition once.
As is apparent from the characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game of coalition formation, allowing players to move more than once
in the sequence would not a¤ect our results. However, excluding some play-
ers from the order of proposers would clearly change our analysis, since the
status quo payo¤s would then play a role in the determination of the equi-
librium outcome. This implies that the agenda setter could bene…t from
excluding some players from the order of proposers, and that his power may
be enlarged by allowing him to choose incomplete orderings of the players.
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